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Abstract: Since September 2015 and the Russian military intervention in the country, the interests in Syria 
have been numerous and of great importance for the actors involved in this conflict. The interests in Syria 
are numerous and of great importance for the actors involved in this conflict. Russia, like the Allies and 
opponents of the Bashar Al-Assad regime, is fighting for geopolitical, geo-economic, or ideological 
reasons. The Middle East region finds itself shaken by the sharp resurgence of a confrontation between 
actors allied to the United States, other allies of Russia, and this Syrian crisis thus impacts the geopolitical 
configuration of the region. This paper presents an analysis of the Russian intervention strategy in Syria. 
We argue that Russia intervened in Syria to strengthen the already existing Russian-Syrian alliance, to curb 
extremist proliferation, and to take advantage of Syria's strategic position. The objective is to determine 
the reasons for the Russian military intervention in Syria related to energy and geo-economic interests. 
The Russian intervention in Syria was an ideal opportunity to draw closer to several powerful states in the 
region and a way to benefit from positive spin-offs on its arms market and hydrocarbon road plans. 
Despite the risks and costs associated with defending the Syrian regime, Moscow has secured its political 
and economic power in the Middle East. 
 
Keywords: Energy; Geo-Economics; Military Intervention; Russia; Syria 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 6, No. 3, 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 




Having the largest natural gas reserves in the world and being the second-largest 
oil exporter, Russia is seeking to extend its influence and reach as many world markets 
as possible. Putin‟s administration also seeks to maintain and increase its economic 
power, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, while creating strong alliances. The 
Syrian conflict is said to have brought Russia closer to several Middle Eastern powers, 
presenting it with new economic opportunities. Thus, Russia seeks to maintain the 
energy dependence of several neighboring countries. Moreover, Vladimir Putin uses 
many ingenious and cunning strategies to achieve his objectives. 
Its large gas resources, the efficiency of its distribution system, and its proximity 
to a large energy-deficient customer base make Russia a price generator for gas. 
Moscow has managed to use price reductions and long-term delivery contracts to push 
other states to support it in its political decisions. 
To achieve its goals and maintain its ability to develop appropriate policies for its 
energy client states, Moscow continues to work to create and maintain a monopoly on 
the production, transmission, and distribution of resources. It is also successfully 
resolving political disagreements over the reduction of oil and gas exports. Second, it 
uses supply cuts as a foreign policy weapon against countries resisting Russia's 
increased influence in their political or economic affairs. 
More than 20 states are involved in the Syrian civil war and hundreds of different 
armed groups were fighting on its territory. Allies of the Syrian regime, including Russia, 
Iran, and China, prevented the overthrow of the Syrian government with their military, 
political and economic support. The Syrian crisis has had disastrous repercussions not 
only on Syrian territory but also on the region. The persistent involvement of several 
actors during the many years of war in Syria has led several researchers to study the 
geostrategic importance of this state in the region. It has allowed them to consider the 
policies of Russia, Iran, and China along with other important countries' policies such as 
the USA, Israel, Turkey, France, UK, Saudi Arabia, UAE, in their studies of the new 
geopolitical configuration of the Middle East. 
This paper will be to define the reasons behind the Russian intervention in the 
Syrian conflict. We will therefore try to deconstruct this analysis by studying both the 
economic and political cooperation sought by Russia and the other key states it is trying 
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ENERGY POTENTIAL AND RUSSIAN-SYRIAN COOPERATION 
 
Russian Interests in the Hydrocarbons Sector 
 
Before the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the country was one of the oil and gas 
producers in the Eastern Mediterranean. Most of its fields were in the east of the 
country, near the Iraqi border, or in the center of the country, east of the city of Homs. 
In 2010, 90% of its exports went to the European Union (Gobat and Kostial 2016). In 
addition to the damage caused during the conflict, both the EU and the US sanctions 
and embargoes on Syria no longer allowed these multinationals to continue production. 
Thus, much of the degradation of the Syrian economy can be attributed to the 
considerable deterioration of oil and gas exports, as well as the drastic decline in 
tourism, the two largest pre-war contributors of income to the country (Cordesman 
2017). 
Even with the multiple losses in the oil and gas sector, the Syrian army continues 
to prioritize the management of its energies, as well as the reconquest of its energy 
territories under the Islamic state. The latter is essential for electricity production to 
meet the needs of the Syrian population and to increase the country's economic rents. 
Moreover, it was also important for the regime and its allies to cut off the resources of 
the rebel groups. In addition to the refineries under the control of different factions, the 
production of crude oil in fields controlled by the Syrian government had fallen 
drastically. It has been estimated that oil rents fell by 98% of GDP between 2010 and 
2014 (Gobat and Kostial 2016). Moreover, GDP fell from 4.7 to 0.14 billion dollars 
between 2011 and 2015 (Coface 2019). Thus, the lack of fuel caused a shortage of 
generated electricity, affecting the primary sector and the processing industry. 
The year 2011 was marked by new opportunities in the oil and gas sector in Syria. 
Indeed, a new strip of natural gas has been discovered in the Homs region, contributing 
to the country's energy development (Aşcı 2018). New sources of oil were also 
discovered in 2015 in the controversial Golan Heights, a Syrian territory occupied by 
Israel since 1981 (Nimmo 2019). Finally, the most important discovery is that found in 
the Levantine Basin, where Syria has an interesting future in the offshore oil and gas 
industry. This Syrian energy potential explains some of the reasons why states such as 
Russia are keen to become involved in Syria. 
The multiple political turmoils that the Arab world has experienced in recent 
years has greatly overshadowed the accelerated exploration of the oil and gas potential 
of the Levantine Basin. Some Levantine countries have already begun to exploit their 
discoveries, but others, such as Syria, are backing off because of political conflict. A large 
source of hydrocarbons in the waters of the Syrian west coast has been discovered and 
projects for its exploitation have been initiated (Paraschos 2013).  
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Moreover, the Syrian Oil Minister has stated that Syria estimates that it holds 
1250 billion m³ of gas along the country's Mediterranean coast. A 25-year contract was 
signed in 2013 between the Russian company „Soyuz Nefte Gaz‟ and the Ministry of Oil 
and Mineral Resources for exploration along Syria's Mediterranean coast (Aşcı 2018). 
However, the prolongation of the war suspended the project in 2015, to resume in 2019 
under less risky conditions. It is believed that such projects in Syria would be crucial for 
future Russian investment opportunities, as well as for the possibility of joint ventures in 
this sector. Undoubtedly, most of the profits will go to the Russian investor during the 
years of the agreement. However, Syria will be able to benefit from new infrastructure, 
an improvement in its oil industry, technology transfer, management training, and 
opportunities in the international market (Henderson 2013). 
The importance of Syrian hydrocarbons alone does not justify Russian 
intervention in Syria. One important reason for its involvement in Syria is the 
geostrategic position of that state. Syria is the exit point from the energy routes to 
Europe. Also, the Middle East region contains most of the world's oil and gas resources. 
All countries wishing to exploit and export these resources by land must pass through 
Syria to get them to the most attractive market, which is Europe. Thus, Russian control 
of Syria's energy industry would give Moscow not only power over Syrian energy prices 
and delivery, but also influence in the Middle East region. Indeed, control over Syria's 
hydrocarbon energy lines is crucial for Russia, as it could give it the ability to influence 
energy prices in its favor. 
The reconquest of the land taken by the Islamic State was not strictly a military 
objective. It was also a paramount strategically economic objective for the Russian 
intervention in Syria. Shares were promised to the Russian companies for each energy 
territory that came back under the control of the Syrian state (Pichon 2018). 
 
Military and Strategic Cooperation 
 
Russia has pledged to stand up to the international community to maintain Al-
Assad, whose departure would prove disadvantageous for Russia and its oil and gas 
companies. Thus, Moscow continues to use its veto power and its international political 
power to support the government of Bashar Al-Assad to prevent Syria from suffering 
the same fate as Libya. The conflicts in Libya and Iraq have resulted in significant 
economic losses for Russia and have made it clear that such scenarios should not be 
repeated in Syria (Kozhanov 2016). Syria remains a key partner in the Russian arms 
market, even if its purchases do not match those of some Middle Eastern states. This 
trade is of importance for Russia since its arms exports have become the main source of 
employment in the military-industrial sector after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At 
the same time, Russia sought to resolve the conflict by leaving its Syrian ally in place, 
allowing a reduction in Russia's military role and legitimized its presence in Syria.  
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To this end, Russia has invested in rebuilding the institutions of the Syrian state, 
the regular army. Its diplomacy was aimed at bridging the gap between the regime and 
the „acceptable‟ elements of the opposition who were prepared to accept a settlement 
in which Assad would remain in power (Hinnebush 2020). This remained unacceptable 
to a large part of the opposition as well as to the Western powers. 
The commitment of Russian diplomacy during its intervention in Syria has shown 
the international community that any decision concerning Syria will have to go through 
Moscow. The presence of Russian armed forces in Syria was another opportunity to 
showcase their military capabilities. It should be added that this military presence made 
the „no-fly zone‟ virtually impossible in Syria and also gave Russia its own EEZ for the 
use of its S-400 missile system and its missile cruiser Moskva (Machnikowski 2015). 
Russia has demonstrated and defended before the international community the 
principles of territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. 
The Russian operation has become “a demonstration of Russian power and a 
demand for a greater role in world affairs” (Bartenev 2018, 758). The Russian military 
presence dates to the 1970s and its intervention in Syria has significantly increased this 
presence thanks to its naval base in Tartous. Indeed, one of Russia's goals in Syria can 
be attributed to obtaining new military zones. The Syrian regime has granted Russia's 
army and private military troops military zones, to help to regain control of its lost 
territories (Souleimanov and Dzutsatti 2018). The continuation of the conflict required 
Russia to establish an airbase on Syrian territory to ensure the protection of Syrian 
airspace and the execution of military operations in the Mediterranean. Thus, Russia 
officially signed an agreement in August 2015, authorizing it to establish an airbase at 
Hmeimim in Latakia. This agreement authorizes the deployment of Russian aircraft and 
soldiers in Syria and the construction of new military bases in the country to launch 
military operations at the request of the Syrian regime (Hetou 2019). In October 2016, 
the agreement on the permanent control of the strategic airbase and the indefinite 
deployment of air forces was ratified. 
In addition, this agreement doubles the space available for warships and 
guarantees the right to control an airbase. Its entry into force in January 2017, therefore, 
guarantees Russia sovereignty over its new zones, thus giving Russian forces full control 
over these territories. More than 63,000 Russian military personnel have received 
combat training in Syria, including more than 25,000 senior officers, 434 generals, and 
more than 4,300 artillery and rocket specialists (Daher 2018). New weapons developed 
by the Russians were used or tested in Syria, which may show that Syrian territory was as 
much a battlefield as it was a testing ground for Russian weapons. The alliance and the 
Russian presence in Syria have given Moscow access to the warm waters of the 
Mediterranean Sea as well as a geostrategic rapprochement with Syria's neighboring 
countries. Also, Syria's west coast lies on the Mediterranean coast, positioning it in an 
interesting and highly coveted center.  
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Moreover, the use of a naval base in Tartus, on Syria's Mediterranean coast, was 
granted to the Russians long before the conflict began. This base was granted to the 
Soviet Union in 1971, allowing them to avoid the passage through the Turkish Straits so 
much disputed by the USSR earlier. With the prolongation of the Syrian conflict, this 
base is a military-strategic tool of extreme importance serving both the Russians and the 
Syrians. Its operational capacity continues to strengthen, the Russian military 
intervention has led to the deployment of more than 1700 Russian military specialists 
and the dispatch of different types of warships and transport (Daher 2018). Thus, the 
Tartous Naval Base is in the process of becoming a permanent military naval base, as 
part of Russia's enlargement plans. 
 
RUSSIA BETWEEN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
Russia has been able to draw closer to certain Middle Eastern powers since its 




Russia and Iran have competing interests in Syria and Assad's continued rule, for 
the time being, are one of their few points of convergence. So far, Iran has provided 
Assad with more boots on the ground and kept him afloat financially, while Russia has 
focused on political and air support. Assad cannot afford to lose either Iran or Russia, as 
they complement each other, and he has played both roles. Since the beginning of the 
financial crisis, Assad has been rising to maximize his falling margin of control (Shaar 
2019). The Iranian case is an interesting and uncertain partnership for Russia. Iran is a 
strong ally of Al-Assad and its level of involvement is very broad and covers military, 
economic and political aspects. Nevertheless, it is easy to conceive of certain differences 
arising between Iran and Russia on military, energy, and post-conflict profit issues within 
Syria's borders. Both Russia and Iran are seeking power and geo-economic influence in 
the region. However, their discourse before the international community remains the 
same, regarding the maintenance of Bashar Al-Assad and the future of Syria. 
The Syrian government signed a landmark pipeline agreement in July 2011 with 
Iran and Iraq, changing the planned pipeline map in the Middle East. This agreement 
was signed after Syria refused to accept Qatari gas and oil pipeline projects that would 
cross its territory, possibly to Europe, in 2009 (Ghoble 2017). The pipeline would pass 
through the Iranian port of Assalouyeh, then through Iraqi territory, through Damascus, 
and finally to Europe through the construction of new pipelines in the Mediterranean 
Sea. This project was to be completed in 3 years and cost nearly 10 billion dollars. 
Nevertheless, it had to be interrupted during the Syrian conflict. Such a project would 
have contributed to the export of Iranian gas and competition on the energy market 
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with Russian and Qatari gas (Sogoloff 2017). The sanctions imposed on Iran completely 
blocked this project since the products could not be sold to Europe. It is therefore here 
that one can understand the opportunities that Russia is seeking to exploit. Indeed, Iran 
remains Russia's best partner in the Middle East. Putin is keen to create agreements for 
the transport of Iranian gas with Russian energy companies. If Western sanctions are 
withdrawn, Iran will begin again to consider its project towards the European market 
(Aşcı 2018). Thus, Iran remains a great rival for Russia, so it is more profitable for Russia 
to create a partnership with Iran than to have it as a competitor. As a result, it also 
brings the Russians closer to their goal of European energy dependence. 
In 2016, Russia reconsidered its strategic objectives in Syria, when the West did 
not seem to offer it interesting negotiation plans. This thus prompted the Kremlin to 
strengthen its support for the Syrian regime and to cooperate with Iran. Despite the 
hardening of Western policy in the face of Russian adventurism on the Syrian question, 
Russia has been maneuvering to ease Western sanctions against it. 
However, on the military side, this Russian-Iranian partnership does not oblige 
Iranian-backed armed groups, in particular, the Al-Quds Force and Hezbollah, to carry 
out orders from Russia in the long term, despite the ground support they provide to 
Russian operations. On the one hand, it is not profitable for Moscow to refuse Iranian 
military-strategic assistance, as this would force Russia to significantly increase its 
ground presence on Syrian borders. On the other hand, Moscow is trying to remain 
vigilant in this partnership, which could affect its relations with other states that it is 
trying to maintain or improve (Kozhanov 2017). 
A full-fledged military alliance with Iran could have consequences for Russian 
diplomacy towards Israel or the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). For the 
time being, the military-strategic partnership between the two countries is limited to 
information exchange and occasional coordination on Syrian territory. 
Between 2016 and 2018, Moscow created the 5th and 6th Corps, which recruited 
different pro-government armed groups, amnestied rebels, and army defectors and 
integrated them into a strong military infrastructure under tight central government 
(and Russian) control. This was intended to diminish Iranian influence on militias and the 
Syrian military while strengthening the Syrian military as a critical state institution 
(Khlebnikov 2020). 
The conflict in Syria now seems to be subsiding and discussions for 
reconstruction between allies of the Al-Assad regime are accelerating. As one of Al-
Assad's main allies and a major contributor to its maintenance since the beginning of 
the conflict, Tehran is being presented with all kinds of opportunities in Syria at the end 
of the conflict. However, Moscow's notoriously successful involvement would have taken 
a large share of Iran's opportunities for profitable projects or forced it to share the 
profits with Russia. Taking this into account, Iran rushed to sign numerous protocols 
from the beginning of 2017 (Pichon 2018). It has managed to negotiate its place in the 
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reconstruction of Syria, by getting involved in sectors such as mobile telephone 
networks, mining, especially phosphate mining, the agricultural sector, and the port 
management of Latakia. Moreover, there have already been several Russian and Iranian 
foreign direct investments (FDI) in Syria since the beginning of the conflict, which seems 
positive for the immediate need for development aid. Moreover, Iran is preparing to 
take a leading role in the reconstruction of the country's pipelines and essential 
buildings, given that it is the largest producer of cement and iron in the Middle East (Al-
Saadi 2015). 
On the issue of investment sharing, the most significant will be the oil and gas 
industry, particularly the pipeline, which would change Moscow's plans (Kozhanov 2017). 
Moreover, Moscow seems dissatisfied with the proximity and power granted to Tehran 
in the management of the port of Latakia. Moscow and Tehran are trying to monopolize 
Syria's main sources of profits, provoking another competition between them. These two 
regional powers should also be ready to protect themselves against the possibility of 
American economic sanctions targeting their companies involved in reconstruction in 




Russia has managed to get closer to Turkey, despite their opposition in Syria and 
its relations with Iran. As a guardian of the straits, Turkey is a pivotal state in the 
Mediterranean that has been able to take advantage of its position between the 
continents and seas where it is located. However, like many European countries, Turkey 
remains dependent on Russia in terms of energy. It is its main dependent partner, 
importing more than 55% of its natural gas from Russia and 35% of its coal (Prontera 
and Ruszel 2017). 
Turkish energy routes are not only among the Russian geostrategic plans but also 
among some powerful actors in the Middle East region who want to make use of this 
transit space (Mocilnikar 2018). It should also be revealed that almost all its gas is 
imported, as Turkey is fully dependent on Russian gas (Prontera and Ruszel 2017). Thus, 
one can understand Turkey's desire for energy diversification, but also the Russians' 
determination to curb these plans. The seriousness of the Syrian conflict and the 
Russian/Iranian involvement have blocked potential projects for new energy routes to 
Europe. Turkey was interested in several pipeline projects proposed by various Arab-
Persian countries and Israel, intending to pursue its energy diversification plan. If Turkey 
decides to go ahead with the project, the pipelines will have to cross through Syria's 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), where Russia has control. Otherwise, it will have to pass 
through the EEZ of Cyprus, with which Moscow has good relations, unlike the one 
between Ankara. Also, an agreement has been formalized between Russia and Cyprus 
giving the Russians the right to use Cypriot port and airport facilities during their 
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intervention in Syria. The allies of the Syrian regime shall under no circumstances allow 
the execution of such a pipeline project, which could directly harm their market and 
power in the region. 
However, a discussion has taken place between Tel Aviv-Nicosia-Athens on a 
pipeline project that could not only threaten Russia's planned European energy 
dependence on Russia but also totally exclude Turkey. The latter would lose its power as 
a transitional country and block its diversification project, while the Russian gas market 
would be threatened (Prontera and Ruszel 2017). Thus, Moscow and Ankara have a new 
common interest in blocking any project that excludes them. Despite the coldness of 
relations between Moscow and Ankara during a large part of the Syrian conflict, their 
relations were quickly rekindled. The resumption of the 'Turkish Stream' gas pipeline 
project in partnership with the Russian gas giant Gazprom, to connect Russia to Turkey. 
This created a distance between Turkey and the West, which Russia welcomed. 
Erdogan is thus more provocative towards the West, which caused Westerners to 
be perplexed by his authoritarian habits. Russia has been able to use its presence in 
Syria to establish a strong influence in the Middle East region. It has also countered the 
Western influence present in the Middle East by moving closer to the only Eastern 
member: Turkey. Moreover, a recent agreement between Russia and Turkey provides for 
the construction of a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, Turkey (Aşcı 2018). This Russian 
construction will make the plant operational by 2023 and will cost nearly $20 billion. This 
agreement could be the beginning of the advent of Russian-Turkish relations. 
An agreement was recently reached between Turkey and Russia for the purchase 
of four S-400 anti-aircraft batteries. So far, two other countries have concluded this 
agreement with Russia, namely China and India. Several states are also considering 
making the same purchase, which rivals the US arms market and the power they have in 
some of these regions. This agreement amounts to nearly $2.5 billion and remains 
controversial because of Turkey's alliance with NATO (Taylor 2018). Indeed, NATO is 
concerned about this purchase, as there is nothing to prevent Turkey from buying arms 




Today, the energy plans of the Gulf monarchies are the most threatening for 
Russia. Only ten Middle Eastern countries hold nearly half of the world's oil reserves and 
more than 40% of its gas reserves. These include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman. Most of the latter are members of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Also, the above-mentioned 
pipeline project from Qatar to Turkey to Europe should have passed through Syria. One 
of the theories of the impulsive involvement of Qatar and Saudi Arabia against Al-Assad 
comes from its rejection of this project on its territory. One can therefore understand 
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the importance of these petro-monarchies to get rid of this regime to be able to start 
their pipeline project. However, such a project poses a great threat to Russia, for which 
Europe is its largest importer of gas. Thus, Putin needed to have some control in Syria to 
be able to block not only Qatar's plans but also the sale of oil from Saudi Arabia (Aşcı 
2018). Having reached an agreement with Iran on the one hand, Putin has developed his 
plan to reduce and even eliminate the threat from petro-monarchies. This would 
simultaneously reduce the influence of their American ally in the region. Moreover, 
Russia signed an agreement towards the end of 2016 with OPEC and Saudi Arabia to 
limit oil production, which would cause the price per barrel of oil to rise (Mocilnikar 
2018). This was well received by its signatories since the agreement was renewed until 
the end of 2018 (Delanoë 2018) and recently renewed again until 2020. This strategic 
agreement has stabilized the oil market and its regulation according to market demand. 
It contributes as much to the stability as to the development of the sector. On the other 
hand, it has also helped to prevent price declines caused by the production of 
predominantly American hydrocarbons. 
While Russia and the Gulf monarchies are competitors in the global oil and gas 
market, they are also rivaling at the political level. These Petro-monarchies have allied 
themselves with the United States over time, strengthening Western influence in the 
region. However, Russia has developed good relations with the petro-monarchies, 
despite its alliance with Iran, in addition to differences over the Syrian conflict. Putin has 
shown leadership by signing an agreement with OPEC to which his state is not a 
member and has been able to find common ground between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
Even if Russia and some Middle Eastern states are rivals on various fronts 
(economic, political, ideological), Moscow retains credibility through diplomatic 
persuasion to reach an agreement with all the players in the region. Nevertheless, 
Russian relations with rival powers represent a risk for Moscow. If its relations with Iran 
are not maintained prudently, Russia risks first degrading its relations with the GCC. By 
doing so, it aims to affect the potential for investment in the Russian economy, provoke 
Sunni Islamist movements in Russia and finally undermine the diplomatic efforts Russia 
is working on to resolve the conflict in Syria. In this way, its activism and patience on 
energy, geopolitical and security issues in the Middle East have given it a foothold in the 
region's affairs with several rival states (Delanoë 2018). 
For some years now, Putin has remained cautious in the face of tensions between 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia since the summer of 2017, which led to Qatar's decision to leave 
OPEC in 2019. Faced with this situation, Moscow has remained neutral to protect its 
national interests and has not refrained from working on agreements with each of them. 
Indeed, Russia has recently discussed more than fifteen agreements with Saudi Arabia, 
including the construction of a nuclear power plant in Saudi Arabia and a package of 
arms sales. Aside from the many military and technical cooperation agreements signed 
between Russia and Qatar, the latter also seems interested in procuring the famous S-
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400s, which caused the Saudi protest (Kabalan 2018). On the other hand, Qatar recently 
invested in the Russian economy with the purchase of shares in the Russian oil company 
Rosneft, in the amount of 11.3 billion dollars (Karasik 2017). In short, the diminishing 
American involvement in the region, the inconsistency and unpredictability of the Trump 
administration, and the Russian victory in Syria have motivated the petro-monarchies to 





Because of the various points raised in this paper, several observations emerge. 
First of all, the Russian military intervention in Syria since 2015 was not part of the 
application of the grand Middle East or even global strategy but of a pragmatic search 
for the projection of energy and economic interests, and an attempt to resolve the 
closest concerns in the region, which are the primary concern of its foreign policy. This 
paper tried to highlight the geo-economic rationale for the Russian intervention in Syria. 
It aimed to dissect several causes of the Russian strategy in the Syrian conflict. The 
analysis allowed us to investigate how Russia managed to regain the powerful position 
it had at the time of the USSR on the international scene. Putin was able to take 
advantage of every international event to accumulate geopolitical and geo-economic 
gains in the Middle East. His alliance with the Syrian regime, as well as his preponderant 
participation in the military support to Al-Assad in the civil war, enabled him to become 
a powerful player in the stakes of the region. Any issue or decision related to Syria now 
goes through Moscow. His fight in Syria has enabled him to weaken extremist groups in 
Syria to prevent the spread of extremist ideology on his territory or in those of his 
former Soviet republics. This has thus earned him military zones and shares in the 
hydrocarbon sector offered by the Syrian regime. This „war on terror‟ initiative has been 
instrumentalized by Russia as an instrument to help it break out of the diplomatic 
isolation it has suffered for several years in the West (Notte 2016). Syria's geostrategy 
was crucial for Russia's future hydrocarbon route projects. It was also important for 
blocking the pipelines of other countries that were likely to compete with its policies 
aimed at maintaining Europe's energy dependence on its hydrocarbons. Moscow also 
used its intervention in Syria to draw closer to several Middle Eastern regional powers. 
Despite the coldness of Russian-Turkish relations during the Syrian conflict, Moscow 
managed to renew its relations with Ankara. This led to the conclusion of important 
agreements on armaments, conventional energy, and nuclear technology. Moreover, it 
used the same tactics with powerful petro-monarchies, notably Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 
Despite their alliance with Washington, Russia has managed to demonstrate its power 
with these countries and to reduce American influence. In this way, several agreements 
were created and linked to the hydrocarbon sector, the most important being the 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 6, No. 3, 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                            
 49 
Turkish Stream with Turkey. The vision emanating from the Kremlin also secured gains 
for its arms deal with Turkey. Finally, its intervention in Syria offered new development 
opportunities, thanks to the cooperation of its Iranian and Turkish allies. Finally, Russia's 
alliance with these regional powers enabled it to win the war in Syria and strengthen its 
position in the Middle East. Also, Russia's strategy has highlighted how energy issues 
and the geo-economy are now setting the pace for political decisions. We have seen 
that Putin has taken advantage of the differences and issues at stake between certain 
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